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Abstract 
We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy on 
entrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
data merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive 
linear link between the size of the shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. However, 
this masks more complex relationships. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for 
potential endogeneity where required, the impact of the shadow economy on entry is found 
to be negative, based on a linear specification. Moreover, there is also evidence of non-
linearity: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the shadow economy is of medium size. 
We attribute the negative effects of shadow economy on entry to perceived strong 
competition faced by new entrants when the shadow economy is widespread. At the 
individual level, an extensive shadow economy has a more negative impact on 
respondents who are risk averse. In addition, in the economies where property rights are 
strong, the negative impact of the shadow economy is weaker. 
 
Key words: shadow economy, entrepreneurship 
JEL Classification codes: O17; D2; L26; P14 
 
* We are grateful to Chris Gerry and to Mark Schaffer in particular for an insightful 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we analyse theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy 
on levels of entrepreneurial activity. Our main concern is whether the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial entry by an individual is affected by the scale of the shadow economy. The 
theory yields a number of alternative predictions. The informal sector could be viewed as 
passive, merely supplying labour to the formal sector at a relatively low fixed wage in a 
segmented labour market model (i.e. Loayza, 1994; Fields, 2005). In this case, one would 
expect no particular relationship between entrepreneurial activity and the size of the 
shadow economy. In contrast, building on the work of de Soto (1990), the informal sector 
could be regarded as a potential basis for employment creation and growth. Drawing on 
Latin American experience, Maloney (2004) has argued that the informal sector is in fact 
best viewed as entrepreneurial; “as a first approximate, we should think of the informal 
sector as the unregulated developing country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial 
small firm sector found in developed countries” (p.1). This perspective might indicate a 
positive relationship between country-specific levels of entrepreneurial activity and the size 
of the shadow economy. However, much of the literature is less sanguine about the 
operation of shadow economy. De Paula and Scheinkman (2006) focus on tax avoidance 
as the main determinant of informality, and deduce that informal sector firms will be 
smaller and will have a higher cost of capital than their formal sector counterparts; 
hypotheses confirmed on Brazilian data. Such arguments would lead one to expect that 
levels of entrepreneurial activity will be lower in economies where the shadow economy is 
larger. Our approach is in the same tradition, but focuses on the impact of segmentation 
on competition and entry barriers in the two sectors. 
The shadow economy itself is returning to the forefront of the policy agenda. For the first 
time since the establishment of the European Union, one of its member states faces a 
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serious fiscal crisis: Greece, with its budget deficit at least at 13% of GDP in 2009. It is 
estimated that about a quarter of the country’s value added is created in the shadow 
economy. Moving this production into the formal economy would generate about 15 billion 
Euros (20 billion USD) in additional tax revenues. This problem is not new, yet in the past 
the shadow economy has proved very difficult to reduce.1
We suggest that a shift from the informal to the formal economy is hampered by a 
collective action problem because the effectiveness of the formal economy (and its 
attractiveness to individual players) is conditional on its widespread acceptance and on 
compliance. Moreover, the pattern of exchange in the shadow economy relies on informal 
institutions based on local structures of trust. These imply that the participants develop 
related network capital, which, once accumulated, represents a sunk cost making people 
less willing to switch to a system based on formal rules. Thus, even if the origins of the 
shadow economy may be linked to inefficient government and regulations, once 
established, the shadow economy can become embedded. It becomes transformed from 
the level of day-to-day strategies of economic actors responding to taxes, regulation and 
governance structures to the level of norms and business culture characterised by long 
term stability (Williamson, 2000). This implies that we need to consider the shadow 
economy, not just as an economic outcome that varies with high frequency in response to 
The economics of institutions 
indicates why such bad equilbria may persist.  In particular, Dixit (2004) presents a formal 
model of institutional change, in which the mechanics rely on network effects and 
economies of scale. It may be costly for individual actors, to move out of the informal 
economy, given that others may not follow. Entrepreneurs who move into the formal 
economy may then be disadvantaged relative to those who remain in the informal sector. 
This is an insight upon which we base some of the arguments in this paper.  
                                                 
1 “Wall Street Journal Europe”, 10th of February 2010. 
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current economic incentives, but as a stable element of economic environment 
representing norms and values, which are difficult to change.  
 
Our paper focuses on the ways in which the existence of a shadow economy might affect 
the decision of an individual in a particular national context to become an entrepreneur. 
There is a considerable literature on the determinants of the informal sector, such as 
regulation, taxation and corruption (Friedman et al, 2000), as well as about its negative 
effects on tax revenues and the provision of public services (Rauch, 1991; Loayza, 1994; 
Levy, 2007). However, there has been little explicit empirical treatment of the inter-
relationship between the informal sector and the processes underlying economic growth 
such as entrepreneurship. We follow numerous authors from Schumpeter (1934) in 
regarding entrepreneurship as an economic activity central to the longer term process of 
development (e.g. Liebenstein, 1968; Baumol, 1990; Acs, 2006; Samuelson, 2009; 
Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).  
 
Our empirical work is based on the Global Entrepreneurial Monitor (GEM) project, 1998 – 
2005. This is the best choice for our research questions because uniquely it includes data 
on both formal and informal sector entrepreneurship (see Acs et al, 2008). Our interest is 
not in the distribution of entrepreneurship between formal and informal activity however, 
but in the pattern of entrepreneurial activity conditioned by the size of the shadow 
economy. The latter is measured using the new dataset generated by Schneider and 
Buehn (2009). We also control for institutional context at the country level using data from 
the World Bank, Polity IV and Wall Street Journal–Heritage databases. 
 
In our empirical work, we explore the interplay between the size of shadow economy, the 
5/49 
size of the government, the protection of property rights and entrepreneurial entry, utilising 
1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data merged with macro level 
variables. The simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive relationship between the 
size of the shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. However, this masks more 
complex causal structures. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for potential 
endogeneity, the impact of the shadow economy on entry is found to be negative. There 
are also strong indications of non-linearity: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the 
shadow economy is of medium size. We attribute the negative effects of the shadow 
economy on entry to the perception of new entrants that competition will be stronger where 
the shadow economy is more widespread. At an individual level, we find that an extensive 
shadow economy has even greater negative impact on respondents who are risk averse. 
In addition, in economies where property rights are stronger, the negative impact of the 
shadow economy on entrepreneurship is relatively weaker. 
 
The following section summarises our hypothesis concerning entrepreneurship, the 
shadow economy and the institutional environment. The data we employ in our empirical 
work is presented in the third section, and our estimation methods and econometric issues 
are presented in the fourth. We present results in the fifth section and draw conclusions in 
the sixth. 
 
2. The Shadow Economy, Institutions and Entrepreneurship 
 
2.1 The impact of the shadow economy on entrepreneurship 
 
A potential entrepreneur’s decision to enter is likely to be affected by the size of the 
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shadow economy. Ceteris paribus, the segmentation of the market into a formal and 
informal sector implies that a potential entrepreneur may face more competition when 
initiating her business in the formal sector. This can arise from at least two sources. First, 
there will be relatively fewer firms in the formal sector, potentially enhancing the market 
power of incumbents. Second, an entrant also faces competition from the informal sector, 
which can produce goods or services at lower cost because it does not need to meet 
government regulations with respect to wages and working conditions and does not pay 
taxes (De Paula and Scheinkman, 2006). 
 
However, while formal entry may come with its own specific costs, informal entry may also 
be difficult. In countries where institutions are weak and the informal sector is widespread, 
we observe a phenomenon of ‘insider entrepreneurship’ (Aidis et al., 2008): network 
capital, which is critical for informal business activities, may yield significant advantages for 
incumbents vis-a-vis (unrelated) newcomers. Since the seminal contribution by De Soto 
(1989; 2000), we understand the logic of collective action in the shadow economy. It may 
be characterised by an impressive set of norms representing a self-organisation effort that 
substitutes for formal rules. At the same time however these informal institutions come with 
high transactions costs which are likely to bear more on entrants than incumbents. An 
even darker side of shadow economy may be that it could be associated with criminal 
structures: while entering the informal sector the entrepreneurs may avoid taxes and 
regulatory cost but in exchange they may become exposed to organised rackets. Taking 
those two potential effects related to formal and informal sector correspondingly, we 
conclude that overall (formal plus informal) entry rates may not be as high in economies 
with larger informal sectors. 
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Additional effects can also be identified. First, the nature of informal sector may change 
with its size. With an extensive size, the shadow economy may become more ingrained 
into the economic system and the quality of its institutional arrangements may improve. 
Consistent with this, a transition from a middle-sized to a large shadow economy may 
represent a move from the dominance of particular interests to the emergence of 
encompassing interests. To understand this effect, we may follow Olson’s (2000) logic of 
collective action: it is precisely the extensiveness of the informal sector and the extent of 
encompassing common interest in solving the collective action problem that may lead to 
development of a more efficient system of norms.2
                                                 
2 We apply terminology based on Crawford and Ostrom (1995): norms come without explicit formal sanctions 
and are supported by informal, social and cultural mechanism. In contrast, rules come with explicitly 
defined formal sanctions. 
 Using Olsonian terminology, it is likely 
that with a more widespread and embedded shadow economy, ‘warlords’ running 
fragmented rackets become replaced by more functional organisations, as the interests 
supporting the development of the latter are now more broad. Thus, where the informal 
sector comes to dominate a significant spectrum of economic activity, it is likely that more 
sophisticated and functional forms of informal organisation are adopted. This is the case of 
Peru that De Soto (1989) analyses in his seminal work. He documents the complex 
informal systems of organisation of exchange in the shadow economy based on consistent 
expectations formed via repeated behaviour, yet without any foundations in the formal 
sanction of the law (De Soto 1989; 2000). This possible transformation of the nature of the 
shadow economy as a function of its size leads us to hypothesise that the impact of the 




Second, the impact of the shadow economy is likely to be less negative in contexts where 
the opportunity cost of formal entry is high. A government which is very extensive may also 
be dysfunctional. In this case, as noted by Maloney (2003), the shadow economy may 
offer an alternative option for entry and facilitate some (second-best) productive use of 
entrepreneurial talent. Participation in the formal sector may come with such a high 
opportunity cost that opening up opportunities in the informal sector may actually increase 
entry, despite the high transaction costs associated with the informal sector.  
 
Third, as argued by Gërxhani (2004), the shadow economy may be different in character in 
developing and developed countries. In particular, in developed countries informality may 
be an intermediate stage with new businesses growing and transferring to formal sector. 
However the key dimension here relates to institutional development. In particular, it is a 
strong institutional system, represented by effective property rights, that is conducive to 
entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2009). That in turn affects expectations and the propensity 
to start a new venture. From the individual entrant’s point of view, initial informality may 
indeed represent a useful way to experiment with new ventures that could be transformed 
into high value added projects later on but this is conditional on strong property rights. 
Thus, it is a combination of a limited scope of informality coupled with easy opportunities to 
transfer to formality that is likely to encourage entrepreneurial entry. 
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Fourth, entry decisions are conditional on individual attitudes (Harper, 2003) and these 
may be affected by the size of the informal economy. If potential entrants are concerned 
with competition from the informal sector, then individuals with higher levels of fear of 
failure (lower acceptance of risk) may be affected relatively more by the size of the 
informal sector than those who are not risk-averse. 
 
These interactive effects indicate that it is the configuration of all institutions, not just the 
size of the informal sector that affects entrepreneurial outcomes. Accordingly, our 
hypotheses must be framed in the broader context of institutional theory and this is the 
objective of the next sub-section. 
 
2.2. A broader context: institutions and entrepreneurship 
 
Baumol (1990) argues that entrepreneurial activity could take productive, non-productive 
and even destructive forms, depending on the institutional context.  Institutions and the 
associated incentives and penalties for particular types of economic behaviour determine 
the balance between these three forms, with higher quality institutions motivating 
entrepreneurs to choose productive over value-reducing activities. This framework 
motivates our analysis; the productivity of entrepreneurial entry may vary with the size of 
the shadow economy. Potential entrepreneurs can be viewed as maximizing their 
expected return when making a decision to start new ventures (Casson, 1982). The 
arguments above draw on this framework: potential entrepreneurs make decisions about 
entry taking into account what we identified as specific costs resulting from the size of the 
shadow economy. We view the shadow economy not only as a current equilibrium 
response to varying economic conditions but also as being associated with persistent 
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informal institutions. It is this durable component of the shadow economy that justifies 
considering it as a separate factor affecting entrepreneurial outcomes. Nevertheless, there 
is a serious risk of misspecification, and while our focus remains on the shadow economy 
we should carefully identify and control for other important institutional dimensions. 
Generally, where formal institutions are functioning effectively, risks are reduced, becoming 
primarily associated with the nature of the ventures themselves and the characteristics of 
the individuals’ involved (Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973). In contrast, weak institutions 
may increase net returns to non-productive or even criminal activity, reducing incentives to 
enter (productive) entrepreneurship.  
 
Two specific aspects of the inter-relationship between entrepreneurial activity and 
institutions have been found to be among the most important in the literature (Johnson et 
al., 2002; Dermirguc-Kunt et al., 2006; Klapper et al., 2006). The first is the system of 
property rights. Weaknesses in property rights increase transaction costs, the possibilities 
to use resources indirectly via contracts and the riskiness of entrepreneurial activity. 
Recent theories of entrepreneurship emphasise that “the institution of private property ... 
has an important psychological dimension that enhances our feelings of ... internal control 
and personal agency, and it thereby promotes entrepreneurial alertness” (Harper 2003, p. 
74). De Soto (2000) argues that the lack of a well-defined and efficient system of 
registering, protecting and trading of property rights may be the key obstacle that prevents 
the entrepreneurs from utilising and combining the potentially productive assets and 
turning them into real capital (see also Rodrik, 2000). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
emphasise the critical role for the functioning of a market economy of effective constraints 
on the executive branch of the government, and this defines both elements of protection 
and stability of property rights.  In their approach, property rights are akin to the related, 
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but slightly wider concept of the rule of law, as the latter corresponds to a stable 
institutional framework restraining the erratic use of power by politicians and public 
administrators. 
 
The relationship between property rights and entrepreneurship has been considered in 
previous empirical work, but the results have been ambiguous. The property rights 
indicator was not found to be significant by Klapper et al. (2006), Desai et al. (2003) or 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006). However, Johnson et al. (2002) suggest that the insecurity of 
property rights may be a key factor deterring investment in small manufacturing firms. 
  
The second cluster of factors concerns the welfare and tax system, which influence both 
the opportunity cost and the net financial return to entrepreneurial activity. Here, we 
consider the impact of the extent of the government sector on entrepreneurship. In 
general, a larger government sector will militate against entrepreneurial activity, both via 
state revenues and expenditures. Taxes and welfare provision may affect entrepreneurial 
entry via their direct impact on expected returns to entrepreneurial activity and its 
opportunity cost. High and increasing marginal level of taxes may weaken incentives for 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship by reducing potential gains, while high levels of 
welfare support provide alternative sources of income and therefore by increasing the 
alternative wage may reduce the net expected return to entrepreneurship. Taken together, 
this indicates that a larger state sector will crowd out entrepreneurial activity. 
 
In our empirical design, we take these two institutional dimensions into account, as well as 





3.1 Macro Level Data 
 
The size of the shadow economy is not directly observable. Estimates are taken from a 
new dataset generated by Schneider and Buehn (2009). Their approach builds on the 
previous literature (Schneider and Enste, 2000) and it combines two alternative methods 
of estimation. The first, a more traditional one, is based on currency demand, where the 
unexplained residual demand for money is taken as a proxy for the size of the informal 
sector. The second approach is a latent estimation model that uses a structure of 
equations, in which an unobserved variable, in this case the size of the shadow economy, 
is related to a number of observable indicators, which in addition to the excess demand for 
cash include the unexplained element in participation rates: observed participation rates in 
the formal economy tend to be low where shadow economy is large. A second set of 
equations link the shadow economy to a number of factors that are expected to affect its 
size. These include business regulation, unemployment and the size of government 
transfers.  
 
As noted above, we also focus on two institutional characteristics: property rights and the 
size of the government. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), we use effective 
constraints imposed on the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government as 
the main (and most exogenous) indicator of protection of property rights, taking this 
measure directly from the Polity IV database. As a measure of the size of the government, 
we take the share of government expenses in GDP, which include not just final 
government consumption (government expenditures) but also all transfers (data comes 
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from World Bank, World Development Indicators).3
 
  
The shadow economy is related to the level of economic development – high income 
countries tend to have smaller informal sectors. Moreover, several studies have 
documented the existence of a relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic 
development (Wennekers et al. 2005; Carree et al. 2002; Acs et al. 1994). We control for 
this by including a measure of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP).  
The literature has also been concerned with the link between the overall (cyclical) 
economic performance in a country and the incentives to entrepreneurial entry. Two 
conflicting effects may occur, and it is difficult to decide a priori which has the stronger 
impact. On the one hand, entrepreneurship may be ‘recession-push’, as the opportunity 
cost of entrepreneurial entry is lower when existing firms are not expanding, which reduces 
new job openings. On the other hand, there may be also ‘prosperity-pull’ effect; that is, a 
growing economy leads to larger expected gains from entrepreneurial activity (Parker, 
2004). The rate of economic growth measured by GDP growth has been shown by Van 
Stel et al. (2007) to have a positive effect on the rate of opportunity entrepreneurship. In 
our models we include GDP growth as a control variable. 
 
3.2 Individual Level Data 
 
The data on entrepreneurship and individual-level variables are taken from the GEM 
                                                 
3 In our empirical work it is difficult to distinguish between the size of government expenses and the size of 
government revenue due to the very high level of correlation between the two. There is no easy way to 




project, 1998-2005. GEM data are generated through surveys creating stratified samples 
of at least 2,000 individuals per country. The sample is drawn from the whole working age 
population in each participating country and therefore captures both entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs. While data on business ownership and individual business financing is 
included, entrepreneurial activity is defined here as new, nascent start-up activity. Nascent 
entrepreneurs are defined as those individuals between the ages of 18 – 64 years who 
have taken some real action toward creating a new business in the past year, and expect 
to own a share of those businesses they are starting, which must not have paid any wages 
or salaries for more than three months yet (Minniti et al., 2005). In contrast, established 
entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who own or manage a company and have paid 
wages or salaries for more than 42 months (ibid.). We utilise all available GEM data from 
the 1998-2005 surveys. The individual countries that are included in our sample are those 
reported in Figure 1 below. 
 
The most common controls for personal characteristics influencing entrepreneurship in the 
literature are for age and human capital.  The relationship between entrepreneurship and 
age is typically found to be inverse-U -shaped, with the maximum found at a relatively 
young age (Levesque and Minniti, 2006) and we use a quadratic control in our equations. 
Robinson and Sexton (1994) and Cooper and Dunkelberg (1987) find that the decision to 
become self-employed is influenced by education while the results of Delmar and 
Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Honig (2003) show an education effect for nascent 
entrepreneurs. More recent evidence compiled by Parker (2004) suggests that on 
average, entrepreneurs tend to be more educated than non-entrepreneurs. 
   
Wennekers et al. (2005) found a significant and positive relationship between the 
15/49 
incumbent business ownership and entrepreneurial start-ups. Role models may for 
example help by providing information, which alleviates both uncertainty and the cost of 
starting the business (Minniti, 2005). We therefore also control for whether the potential 
nascent entrepreneur knows other entrepreneurs. In addition, the likelihood of a start-up 
may be influenced by whether the potential entrepreneur is employed while deciding to 
start her business. 
 
In addition, following Harper (2003) we take into account that the entry decisions are 
affected by attitudes; by self-confidence and the attitude towards risk in particular. Based 
on GEM questionnaire, these two dimensions are captured correspondingly by confidence 
that own skills are sufficient to start a business and by lack of fear of failure; as a proxy for 
the latter, the GEM survey asks the respondents if fear of failure would be strong enough 
factor preventing them from starting a new business. 
  
Definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 below. These 
are not statistics based on the whole sample but on the observations actually used in 
estimations, so the joint effect of being missing in data is taken into account. 
 








Simple correlation coefficients between the key macro variables are reported in Table 2. 
We observe a weak positive correlation between the size of the shadow economy and 
entrepreneurial entry (combined formal and informal entry).4
 
  
{Table 2 about here} 
 
We argued above that the negative impact of shadow economy size on the likelihood of 
start-up may be linked to greater levels of competition faced by potential entrepreneurs at 
time of entry. A proper measure of this effect would have to relate to all respondents; 
unfortunately we do not have one at our disposal. The one we have, based on the GEM 
questionnaire, is a question that was asked only to those respondents that are actually 
involved in start-up. That implies a selectivity bias and means that we cannot use this 
variable in the econometric work which follows. However, it is still revealing to note the 
correlations between perceptions of competition by new entrepreneurs and the extent of 
the shadow economy. The GEM survey asks nascent entrepreneurs about their 
expectations on the level of competition, distinguishing between many competitors (coded 
as 1), some competitors (coded as 2) and no competitors (coded as 3). Table 3 below 
documents that there is a significant correlation between the competition measure and the 
size of the shadow economy: the more extensive is the shadow economy, the greater the 
                                                 
4 There is a potential group of outliers: the post-Soviet economies are characterised by both large shadow 
economy sectors and low rates of entrepreneurial entry. The low level of entrepreneurship in transition 
economies is consistent with Estrin and Mickiewicz (2010). However, in our econometric work below, we 
verified that, when an additional dummy representing the transition economies is added to the estimated 
equations, it is never significant. 
17/49 
perceptions of stronger competition. Moreover, when we restrict the sample of nascent 
entrepreneurs only to those involved in high growth projects (those expecting to create 10 
jobs or more), this correlation becomes even stronger: the coefficient doubles in value 
from 0.07 to 0.15. This has important implications for efficiency because these projects are 
particularly significant from the economic point of view.  
 
{Table 3 about here} 
 
4.2 Endogeneity of the shadow economy 
 
Broad correlations provide a first approximation, but may be misleading due both to their 
bivariate nature (omitted variables) and the difficulty in interpreting the results because of 
potential endogeneity issues. We start with the discussion of the latter. An advantage of 
our empirical design is that we can exclude one important type of endogeneity, namely 
simultaneity bias. As discussed, our dependent variable is a indicator that takes a value of 
one if a respondent is involved in a start-up activity. This is regressed on individual 
characteristics and country level variables. The latter, including the size of the shadow 
economy, are of particular interest to us. At the same time, it is difficult to see any 
foundation for the simultaneity bias: an individual entry decision cannot have any 
significant feedback effect on aggregate country level outcomes. However, this argument 
does not exclude all types of endogeneity; in particular if there are aggregate reverse 
effects from entrepreneurship to the shadow economy, those may still induce some weak 
residual correlation between the dependent variable and the error term that applies to 
individual level observations.  
For that reason, for each equation we run, we investigate if there is any indication of 
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endogeneity and use instruments for the shadow economy where necessary. The choice 
of such instruments is not a trivial task. Our strategy is to identify possible instruments and 
check for robustness by applying alternative models. We consider two possible 
instruments:  
(1) the durability of democracy, as proxied by a number of years a country spent under a 
democratic regime uninterrupted (from Polity IV), and  
(2) an indicator of the level of business regulations (from Wall Street Journal – Heritage 
Foundation dataset).  
 
Our choice can be justified both on theoretical and on empirical grounds. First, we have 
argued that the shadow economy is not just a short-run equilibrium outcome, but an 
embedded informal institution. Therefore, we look for variables that are likely to correlate 
with longer-term informal institutions but not with the short term characteristics of 
entrepreneurial entry. From this point of view, the durability of democracy is an appropriate 
measure. It captures a long-term institutional tradition, and it is in the long term perspective 
that formal and informal institutions converge: the long term formal institutional setup 
affects culture and norms, and vice versa. This is consistent with the concept of 
‘democratic capital’ as discussed by Persson and Tabellini (2006). 
  
Our second, instrument is an indicator of the extent to which business is regulated. We 
argue that in the context of a shadow economy, while regulations are likely to have an 
impact on the choice between formal and informal entry, they are less likely to affect the 
overall entry decision, and it is the latter that corresponds to our dependent variable. Thus, 
the extent and cost of business regulations will be associated with the size of the shadow 
economy as a result of an increased opportunity cost of doing business in the formal 
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sector, but not necessary with the entry decision per se. This is exactly what should be 
expected from a good instrument. These intuitions are confirmed by the fact that the 
correlations between both instruments and the dependent variable (entrepreneurial entry) 
are very weak, as reported in Table 4 below. 
 
{Table 4 about here} 
 
Table 4 indicates that both instruments are strongly correlated with the shadow economy. 
However, a far better method to assess if the chosen instruments are not weak is to 
consider the correlation coefficients between the residuals from the following two 
equations: one, where an endogenous variable (shadow economy) is regressed on all 
other explanatory variables, and another where the chosen instrument is regressed on the 
same set of variables. For business freedom, the correlation coefficient between those 
residuals is -0.33, and for democratic durability it is -0.08. This indicates that business 
freedom is a strong instrument for the shadow economy. In turn, democratic durability is a 
little weaker. Hence, we use business regulation as our chosen instrument, but also report 
specifications which use democratic durability and both instruments, to demonstrate that 
our results are not driven by the choice of any particular instrument. 
 
4.3. Further estimation issues  
 
Entrepreneurial entry is affected by other macro level variables and it is not easy to isolate 
the impact of the size of shadow economy. On the one hand, ignoring relevant macro 
variables leads to specification error due to omission, but on the other including too many 
indicators leads to multicollinearity and a risk that the direction and magnitude of effects is 
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forced by over-specification. As noted above, we focus on property rights and the size of 
the government as the two key institutional dimensions for entrepreneurship. For property 
rights, we follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and use constraints on the executive 
branch of the government as the basic (and relatively exogenous) predictor of lack of 
arbitrariness in government actions. For the size of the government, we take the ratio of 
government expenses to GDP. In addition to the theoretical justification, both of our 
chosen indicators are only weakly correlated with the size of the shadow economy, 
alleviating multicollinearity. 
 
In our estimations, we rely on maximum likelihood probit estimator and apply GEM 
population weights. We also cluster standard errors on country-years and include time 
fixed effects. We take this estimation strategy as being superior to the use of country fixed 
effects for several reasons: (i) the GEM panel is highly unbalanced with many countries 
observed in just one year; (ii) variation over time (which is the basis for country-fixed 
effects models) in institutional indicators is problematic because measurement in 
institutional indicators is imperfectly dated and most of the short-term time variation 
represents measurement error; (iii) given the sample size, using country fixed effects 
instead of clustering on country-years would produce low standard errors and boost 
significance levels artificially. Thus while coefficients would be more significant, it is 
problematic to interpret what they actually measure; in short panels meaningful institutional 
variation is all cross-sectional.  
 
However, it is important to control for correlation between observations within each of the 
destination countries by clustering standard errors on the latter. Clustering standard errors 
enables us to relax the standard but unrealistic assumption of independence of all 
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observations. As a result, reported standard errors are measured more accurately, while 
values of coefficients are not affected. We assume that observations are distributed over a 
number of clusters (countries) C1, C2, ..., CN and that these clusters are independent. 
Accordingly, a standard robust estimator of variance given by , where 
the estimator of variance is given by  and vectors u represents contributions of individual 
observations used for weighting is now replaced by , where   
represents a contribution of cluster k. 
 
Our specification strategy is as follows. We estimate equations for an individual choice to 
be engaged in a start-up and include all the individual and macro level variables discussed 
above. We start with a linear specification for the shadow economy but go on to consider 
non-linearities using both a logarithmic transformation of the shadow economy and a cubic 
one. Finally, we introduce interactive effects between the shadow economy and: the size of 
the government, the protection of property rights, the fear of failure as captured on 
individual level. These specifications correspond to our priors as discussed in section 2.1 
above. For each of our models we report results based on the three alternative 
instrumentation  strategies. Where endogeneity tests cannot reject the null, we also report 
results based on models with no instrumenting. 
 
5. Econometric Results 
 
Our results are reported in Tables 5-7 below. Specifications (1)-(3) relate to models where 
the share of shadow economy in GDP is entered in linear form, but based on alternative 
instruments. Specifications (4)-(6) report the models with the share of shadow economy 
transformed into natural logarithm. We find that the shadow economy has a negative 
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impact on entry, and is significant in all six models.  
 
All these results come from specifications where we also find other significant institutional 
effects. Protection of property rights has a positive impact on entrepreneurial entry, being 
significant in most specifications, though it is insignificant where durability of democracy is 
used as an only instrument. One possible reason for this sensitivity is that strong 
constraints on executive branch of the government are positively correlated with 
democratic durability so some degree of multicollinearity is being introduced. In contrast, 
the size of government as proxied by the ratio of expenses to GDP always retains a highly 
significant negative impact and higher levels of GDP per capita is also always associated 
with less entrepreneurial entry, though the relationship is nonlinear, as captured by 
logarithmic specification. In turn, the impact of the annual variation in GDP growth, which is 
our proxy for economic opportunities, is highly insignificant and changes sign between 
equations. We also run the models without GDP growth rates but other results were not 
affected (not reported, but available on request). The individual level effects are all 
consistent with existing research as discussed above. 
 
After those benchmark specifications we next turn to a cubic specification of the shadow 
economy. To understand why this has an empirical appeal, consider Figure 1 below. To 
show the pattern more clearly, we use country level averages and given that we control for 
GDP per capita (PPP) in our models, as a measure of shadow economy we use residuals 
from a regression of the size of the shadow economy on GDP per capita. The two curves 
on the outside of the cubic approximation on Figure 1 show the 5% confidence intervals. 
On the left hand side of the graph we see countries with a relatively smaller shadow 
economy relative to that predicted by their level of development. They are also 
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characterised by relatively high start-up rates. We find for example Jordan, Chile and New 
Zealand in that group. Next we have countries with a shadow economy a size consistent 
with their level of development, in the medium range. Entrepreneurial entry tends to be 
weak in this group, which includes Sweden, France, Slovenia, Hungary and Japan 
amongst other. Finally, we have countries with a larger shadow economy than expected at 
a given level of development, but where entry rates are also high. We find Brazil, Uganda 
and Peru in this group. 
 
{Figure 1 about here}    
 
A cubic in the shadow economy is entered in probit models (7)-(11) reported in Table 6 
below. Specifications (7)-(9) are where the shadow economy is instrumented using the 
three alternative options discussed above. The signs of the linear and cubic terms come 
as consistently significant and with the expected sign: first negative and next positive, as 
with Figure 1. It is also interesting to note that endogeneity is no longer a problem, based 
on insignificant results of the Wald test (related to athro in Table 6). This suggests that the 
endogeneity issues we encountered previously may be associated with failing to account 
for more complex non-linearities linking the size of the shadow economy with entry. Based 
on these results, we run model (10) where no instruments for the shadow economy are 
used. Again, both terms of the shadow economy have the expected signs and we confirm 
that stronger property rights are associated with a higher likelihood of entry and a larger 
size of the government is associated with a lower likelihood of entry. 
   
Equation (11) offers an additional test. Given that Peru is a clear outlier (see Figure 1), it 
could be that the non-linear effect is largely driven by this country. Therefore, we replicate 
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the earlier model excluding Peru. While the size and significance of the cubic effect is 
reduced, our previous findings still hold. 
  
We also ran a specification which includes a dummy for transition economies which have 
significantly lower levers of entrepreneurship for their level of development (Aidis et al, 
2008). Figure 1 shows that the transition economies, Russia, Latvia and Slovenia in 
particular, tend to be located in the lower right hand corner of the graph: with shadow 
economies larger than what is predicted by their level of development. We find that, with 
the transition dummy added, the cubic effect gains in significance: it is now significant at 
the 0.001 level. However, the transition dummy is itself marginally insignificant, so we 
neither report nor consider it further (available on request). 
 
We next turn to alternative specifications of nonlinearity, by introducing the three 
interactive effects discussed in sections 1-3. These are between the size of the shadow 
economy and (i) the individual’s lack of fear of failure (ii) the size of the government, and 
(iii) the protection of property rights. We first run three models, where we add each of 
these interactions separately to the equation where the shadow economy enters in linear 
form.  
 
In all these models, our interactions have expected signs and are significant. The 
coefficient on the interaction between the lack of fear of failure and the shadow economy 
has a positive sign. This suggests that the respondents who are less risk averse are also 
less affected by the size of the shadow economy. The interaction between shadow 
economy and government size is also significant, implying that a negative impact of a 
larger government on entry may be alleviated by the presence of shadow economy, as it 
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creates some alternative second-best opportunities for entry. Finally, the interactive term 
between strong property rights and the shadow economy is also positive, which may be 
seen as consistent with Gërxhani (2004): in countries with higher quality institutions, the 
shadow economy may play a role of introductory stage where new entrepreneurs test their 
skills while remaining informal. At the same time, higher quality institutions provide them 
with attractive opportunities to become formal so as to realise the full potential of their 
projects later on. Expectations of such a scenario will affect the likelihood of entry. 
However, while suggestive, all the interactive results discussed here may suffer from 
misspecification, because the cubic term of the shadow economy has not been introduced, 
though our evidence suggests this specification is superior to the linear one. Therefore, 
robust test for these additional interactive effects require that the shadow economy is 
entered in both linear and cubic terms, as is done in models (12)-(14) and reported in 
Table 7. Once this more stringent test is performed, only the third interactive effect remains 
significant (specification (14)). That is, it is where property rights are strong that the 
shadow economy may play some positive role. Again, we interpret this result in line with 
Gërxhani (2004): with higher quality institutions, an entrepreneur may enter the market via 
informal channels, but she has the opportunity to realise the full potential of her venture in 
the formal sector later on. 
 
All the results reported so far have been concerned with the determinants of the likelihood 
of entrepreneurial entry, regardless of the characteristics of the new venture. However, as 
argued by Estrin et al. (2009), it may be more important from the policy point of view to 
focus on a narrower category of entry: new start-ups with significant growth potential. For 
that reason, we replicate all our estimations using an alternative dependent variable. We 
now only consider entry which is associated with aspirations of creating 10 jobs or more, 
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which may be labelled high growth aspiration entrepreneurship. While, those are only 
expectations at time of entry, they have strong predictive power for subsequent outcomes 
and therefore may be taken as a good indicator of the new venture dynamism. 
These additional tests reported in Tables 8-10, fully verifying the robustness of our 
previous results on this narrower category of entry. In particular, we confirm that the 
shadow economy has a non-linear effect on high growth aspirations entry and that there is 
a significant positive interactive term between the shadow economy and property rights. 
The key difference between the two sets of results is that the level of development (as 
represented by GDP pc PPP) is consistently insignificant. This implies that, while overall 
entry rates are lower in countries at a higher level of development, this does not apply to 
higher growth potential projects. Thus, the composition of entrepreneurial entry in rich 




This is the first cross-country study that deals with the impact of the size of the shadow 
economy on likelihood of entrepreneurial entry in general, and on likelihood of entry into 
high growth aspiration activities. We find that the likelihood of entry decreases with the 
size of the shadow economy. These results are corroborated by our finding that when the 
shadow economy is larger, entrepreneurs perceive more competition at time of entry 
decision which may deter them from starting new businesses. Moreover, this perceived 
competition effect, conditional on the size of the shadow economy, is stronger for high 
growth aspiration projects. 
 
However, as illustrated by Figure 1, and confirmed by specifications reported in Tables 6-7 
27/49 
and 9-10, the negative effect of larger shadow economy may be reversed at a large size. 
We interpret this as suggesting that where shadow economy is large, it becomes 
institutionally embedded generating a set of norms for economic transactions, which 
provide an alternative order for economic organisations. Within our data, this case is best 
illustrated by Peru, entirely in line with an analysis of the functionality achieved by informal 
organisations demonstrated by De Soto (1989, 2000). We suggest that this transformation 
of the shadow economy from disruptive into a more efficient self-organisation is consistent 
with Olsonian stress of importance of encompassing interests (Olson, 2000). Thus, the 
likelihood that an efficient alternative form of economic order emerges may increase as the 
size of the shadow economy rises. However the path-breaking analysis of De Soto (1989) 
should not be generalised to all cases: Peru may not be representative of other middle 
income and developing countries and overall the impact of the shadow economy on 
entrepreneurial entry is disruptive. In addition, we found that the shadow economy may 
have a less negative effect on entrepreneurship in economies characterised by strong 
property rights: in that case, an initial phase of informality may transfer to the formal sector, 
resulting in realisation of a full potential of a successful project, in line with Gërxhani 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Std.D
ev. 
Min Max 
Startup (nascent entrepreneur) .04 .20 0 1 
Female .52 .50 0 1 
Owner/manager of existing business(es) .07 .26 0 1 
Business angel in last three years .04 .19 0 1 
Knows other entrepreneurs .34 .48 0 1 
Education: post-secondary or more .21 .41 0 1 
Education: higher .10 .30 0 1 
Education: secondary or more .64 .48 0 1 
Currently in employment .54 .50 0 1 
Age 43.2 15.87 14 99 
Fear of failure would not prevent from starting a business .63 .48 0 1 
Believes that does not have skills to start a new business .52 .50 0 1 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity) 
10.01 .67 6.69 10.68 
Annual GDP growth rate 2.77 2.51 -10.89 10.60 
Effective constraints on executive branch of the government 
(Polity IV) 
6.64 1.06 3 7 
Percentage share of government expense in GDP 31.11 8.97 10.45 48.03 
Percentage share of shadow economy in GDP 17.45 8.86 7.2 60.30 
Business freedom (Heritage Fundation/Wall Street Journal) 75.76 9.78 55 100 
Durability of democracy (years uninterrupted under 
democracy (Polity IV) 
62.55 56.70 1 196 
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Table 2. Simple correlations between the macro level variables and entrepreneurial entry 
 
             | shadow     GDP p.c. GDP     Govern.  Constr.  Startup 
             | economy    ppp      growth  expense  on exec. 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Shadow econo-|   1.0000  
-my / GDP    | 
             |    
             | 
GDP p.c. ppp |  -0.7910   1.0000  
             |    
             |    
             | 
GDP growth   |   0.2354  -0.1923   1.0000  
             |    
             |    
             | 
Government   |  -0.1234   0.1243  -0.2702   1.0000  
Expense / GDP|    
             |    
             | 
Constraints  |  -0.1630   0.1985  -0.3314   0.4051   1.0000  
On executive |    
             |    
             | 
Startup      |   0.0748  -0.0743   0.0190  -0.0781  -0.0427   1.0000  
(nascent     |    
Entrepreneur)|    
             | 
 
(The table shows R2) 
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Table 3 Correlation between shadow economy and expected level of competition (using 
the small subsample for which the latter variable is available) 
 
 
3a/ For all start-ups 
 
             | expected   shadow 
             | compet.    economy/GDP 
-------------+------------------ 
expected     |   1.0000  
level of     | 
competition  |    52100 
             | 
shadow econo-|  -0.0719   1.0000  
my / GDP     |   0.0000 
             |    41712   4.5e+05 
 
3b/ For high growth start-ups (more than 10 jobs expected) 
 
             | expected   shadow 
             | compet.    economy/GDP 
-------------+------------------ 
expected     |   1.0000  
level of     | 
competition  |     1113 
             | 
shadow econo-|  -0.1547   1.0000  
my / GDP     |   0.0000 
             |      857     3074 
      
Remarks: 
 
1/ the table reports simple correlation coefficients, probability and number of observations. 
 
2/ Due to the way the competition is coded in GEM dataset, the results imply that the size 
of the shadow economy is positively associated with more competition for startups, and 
particularly for high-expectations startups.  
    The competition variable is coded in the following way: 
 
    OWN-MANAGE:EXPEC | 
       -TED LEVEL OF | 
         COMPETITION |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
    -----------------+----------------------------------- 
MANY COMPETITORS (1) |     32,391       58.04       58.04 
SOME COMPETITORS (2) |     16,078       28.81       86.85 
  NO COMPETITORS (3) |      3,631        6.51       93.35 
  DOES NOT APPLY (7) |      3,710        6.65      100.00 
---------------------+----------------------------------- 
               Total |     55,810      100.00 
  
3/ In correlations reported above “Does not apply” is transformed into missing. 
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Table 4. Correlations between alternative instruments, the dependent variable and the 
endogenous variables 
 
             | shadow    durable  business  startup 
             | economy   democr.  freedom   (nascent entrepren.) 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
shadow econ. |   1.0000  
durable dem. |  -0.6775   1.0000  
business free|  -0.5686   0.5312   1.0000  
startup      |   0.0748  -0.0127  -0.0388   1.0000 
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Table 5. Determinants of probability of startup: linear and logarithmic shadow economy. IV Probit model. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.0101+ -0.0288** -0.0171*    
 (0.00601) (0.00983) (0.00724)    
Nat. log. of Shadow econ.    -0.143+ -0.500** -0.184* 
    (0.0819) (0.176) (0.0934) 
Female -0.155*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0185) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.233*** -0.231*** -0.235*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0353) (0.0347) (0.0344) (0.0362) (0.0349) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.315*** 0.304*** 0.311*** 0.314*** 0.301*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0368) (0.0327) (0.0294) (0.0370) (0.0320) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.378*** 0.391*** 0.385*** 0.379*** 0.392*** 0.384*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0213) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0227) (0.0206) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0561+ 0.0456 0.0509+ 0.0561* 0.0426 0.0526+ 
 (0.0287) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0269) (0.0289) 
Education: higher 0.108*** 0.0851** 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.0817** 0.115*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0315) (0.0280) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0289) 
Education: secondary or more 0.0644* 0.0286 0.0505* 0.0591* 0.0133 0.0488+ 
 (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0265) 
In employment 0.0348 0.0471 0.0441 0.0354 0.0525 0.0419 
 (0.0372) (0.0406) (0.0398) (0.0375) (0.0428) (0.0394) 
Age 0.0197** 0.0210** 0.0204** 0.0199** 0.0216** 0.0205** 
 (0.00695) (0.00734) (0.00729) (0.00697) (0.00739) (0.00730) 
Age squared -0.000334*** -0.000352*** -0.000344*** -0.000337*** -0.000361*** -0.000346*** 
 (8.41e-05) (8.87e-05) (8.81e-05) (8.43e-05) (8.94e-05) (8.83e-05) 
No fear of failure 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.235*** 0.228*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0218) 
No confidence in own skills -0.706*** -0.697*** -0.707*** -0.708*** -0.696*** -0.713*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0295) (0.0289) (0.0268) (0.0298) (0.0287) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) -0.226** -0.445*** -0.316*** -0.202*** -0.392*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0690) (0.111) (0.0932) (0.0525) (0.0989) (0.0625) 
Annual GDP growth rate -0.00545 0.00568 0.00394 -0.00570 0.00300 0.000751 
 (0.00582) (0.00841) (0.00770) (0.00578) (0.00925) (0.00707) 
Constraints on executive 0.0663* 0.0459 0.0455+ 0.0668* 0.0523 0.0496+ 
 (0.0277) (0.0352) (0.0276) (0.0288) (0.0348) (0.0273) 
Gov. expense / GDP -0.0164*** -0.0177*** -0.0170*** -0.0166*** -0.0169*** -0.0171*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00446) (0.00359) (0.00356) (0.00466) (0.00352) 
Constant 0.460 3.065* 1.575 0.434 3.371* 0.952 
 (0.725) (1.254) (1.052) (0.655) (1.414) (0.830) 
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5. Continued      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) 
Instruments for shadow economy:      
Durability of democracy Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Business freedom No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 246288 239817 239817 246288 239817 239817 
Athrho 0.107* 0.184** 0.127** 0.0696* 0.139** 0.0612+ 
 (0.0419) (0.0571) (0.0488) (0.0320) (0.0523) (0.0364) 
lnsigma 1.585*** 1.584*** 1.457*** -1.677*** -1.319*** -1.771*** 




Table 6. Determinants of probability of startup: cubic shadow economy. IV Probit & Probit.  
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Female -0.158*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.158*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0177) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.229*** -0.239*** -0.232*** -0.229*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0398) (0.0364) (0.0358) (0.0361) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.306*** 0.266*** 0.313*** 0.307*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0483) (0.0335) (0.0313) (0.0305) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.373*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.373*** 0.371*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0291) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0210) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0569* 0.0489* 0.0551* 0.0568* 0.0592* 
 (0.0257) (0.0241) (0.0269) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
Education: higher 0.111*** 0.0583 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0398) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0281) 
Education: secondary or more 0.0620* -0.00332 0.0580* 0.0627* 0.0712** 
 (0.0257) (0.0368) (0.0269) (0.0260) (0.0252) 
In employment 0.0393 0.0651 0.0417 0.0389 0.0371 
 (0.0390) (0.0481) (0.0405) (0.0388) (0.0397) 
Age 0.0199** 0.0221** 0.0202** 0.0199** 0.0199** 
 (0.00694) (0.00745) (0.00725) (0.00694) (0.00707) 
Age squared -0.00034*** -0.00037*** -0.00034*** -0.00038*** -0.00037*** 
 (8.39e-05) (9.03e-05) (8.76e-05) (8.40e-05) (8.52e-05) 
No fear of failure 0.230*** 0.208*** 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0259) (0.0213) (0.0209) (0.0214) 
No confidence in own skills -0.703*** -0.665*** -0.713*** -0.704*** -0.706*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0354) (0.0285) (0.0267) (0.0271) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) -0.112** -0.316* -0.131** -0.110** -0.138*** 
 (0.0373) (0.127) (0.0454) (0.0360) (0.0383) 
Annual GDP growth rate -0.00466 0.00759 -0.00170 -0.00503 -0.00809 
 (0.00796) (0.0192) (0.00892) (0.00776) (0.00592) 
Constraints on executive 0.0515** 0.0649+ 0.0420* 0.0505** 0.0402* 
 (0.0186) (0.0349) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0181) 
Gov. expense / GDP -0.0147*** -0.0123* -0.0152*** -0.0147*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00512) (0.00259) (0.00264) (0.00270) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.0267** -0.106** -0.0245* -0.0254** -0.0170+ 
 (0.00990) (0.0404) (0.0112) (0.00787) (0.00875) 
Shadow econ. Squared 0.000540** 0.00172** 0.000460* 0.000515*** 0.000283+ 
 (0.000164) (0.000661) (0.000186) (0.000125) (0.000170) 
Constant -0.495 2.402 -0.262 -0.519 -0.291 
 (0.415) (1.624) (0.539) (0.384) (0.381) 
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Continued       
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Instruments for shadow economy:      
Durability of democracy Yes No Yes No No 
Business freedom No Yes Yes No No 
Observations 246288 239817 239817 246288 244556 
Athro 0.00579 0.205+ -0.0161   
 (0.0200) (0.109) (0.0215)   
lnsigma 0.412** 0.850*** 0.387***   
 (0.129) (0.0819) (0.118)   




Table 7. Determinants of probability of startup: interactive terms. Probit model. 
 (12) (13) (14) 
Female -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.157*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0355) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0209) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0569* 0.0562* 0.0601* 
 (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0254) 
Education: higher 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0268) (0.0268) 
Education: secondary or more 0.0628* 0.0630* 0.0651* 
 (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0253) 
In employment 0.0386 0.0396 0.0387 
 (0.0388) (0.0394) (0.0391) 
Age 0.0199** 0.0199** 0.0199** 








 (8.40e-05) (8.39e-05) (8.38e-05) 
No fear of failure 0.211*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0211) (0.0208) 
No confidence in own skills -0.704*** -0.704*** -0.708*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) -0.110** -0.114** -0.148*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0393) (0.0423) 
Annual GDP growth rate -0.00501 -0.00558 -0.0111* 
 (0.00778) (0.00813) (0.00564) 
Constraints on executive 0.0506** 0.0507** -0.00312 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0297) 
Gov. expense / GDP -0.0147*** -0.0164*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.00265) (0.00490) (0.00264) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.0261** -0.0298+ -0.0442*** 
 (0.00816) (0.0163) (0.0106) 
Shadow Econ. Squared 0.000516*** 0.000549** 0.000554*** 
 (0.000126) (0.000175) (0.000110) 
Shadow econ. X No fear  0.00104   
 (0.00160)   
Shadow econ. X Gov. Expense  0.000104  
  (0.000258) 
Shadow econ. X Exec. Constraints   0.00249** 
   (0.000958) 
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Table 7. Continued    
 (12) (13) (14) 
Constant -0.506 -0.426 0.191 
 (0.393) (0.530) (0.537) 




Table 8. Determinants of probability of high growth aspiration E startup (>10 jobs): linear and logarithmic shadow 
economy. IV Probit 
       
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.00771 -0.0326** -0.0142+    
 (0.00665) (0.0120) (0.00846)    
Nat. log. of Shadow econ.    -0.109 -0.569** -0.132 
    (0.0920) (0.206) (0.108) 
Female -0.279*** -0.277*** -0.282*** -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.282*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0190) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0385) (0.0394) (0.0395) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.335*** 0.312*** 0.325*** 0.335*** 0.309*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0603) (0.0552) (0.0511) (0.0606) (0.0544) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.392*** 0.403*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 0.403*** 0.394*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0310) (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0323) (0.0292) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0800* 0.0723+ 0.0820* 0.0793* 0.0699+ 0.0832* 
 (0.0366) (0.0378) (0.0372) (0.0367) (0.0370) (0.0375) 
Education: higher 0.166*** 0.132** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.129** 0.175*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0474) (0.0469) (0.0476) (0.0459) (0.0472) 
Education: secondary or more 0.101** 0.0601+ 0.0890** 0.0966** 0.0411 0.0874* 
 (0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0345) (0.0335) (0.0329) (0.0359) 
In employment 0.0418 0.0437 0.0373 0.0414 0.0490 0.0340 
 (0.0345) (0.0373) (0.0357) (0.0348) (0.0398) (0.0356) 
Age 0.00535 0.00825 0.00725 0.00551 0.00890 0.00723 
 (0.00860) (0.00932) (0.00927) (0.00865) (0.00945) (0.00934) 
Age squared -0.000161 -0.000199+ -0.000188+ -0.000164 -0.000209+ -0.000188 
 (0.000105) (0.000114) (0.000113) (0.000106) (0.000116) (0.000115) 
No fear of failure 0.290*** 0.280*** 0.292*** 0.289*** 0.271*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0261) (0.0264) (0.0259) (0.0270) (0.0265) 
No confidence in own skills -0.598*** -0.582*** -0.598*** -0.599*** -0.578*** -0.603*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0400) (0.0372) (0.0348) (0.0405) (0.0369) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) -0.0604 -0.339* -0.138 -0.0413 -0.281* -0.0593 
 (0.0718) (0.133) (0.108) (0.0553) (0.116) (0.0696) 
Annual GDP growth rate 0.00619 0.0150 0.0124 0.00548 0.0128 0.00970 
 (0.00929) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.00919) (0.0137) (0.0111) 
Constraints on executive 0.0241 0.0198 0.0126 0.0249 0.0254 0.0174 
 (0.0279) (0.0433) (0.0314) (0.0291) (0.0409) (0.0296) 
Gov. expense / GDP -0.0111** -0.0122** -0.0112** -0.0115** -0.0113* -0.0117** 
 (0.00359) (0.00460) (0.00361) (0.00378) (0.00476) (0.00372) 
Constant -1.654* 1.545 -0.739 -1.669* 1.957 -1.403 
 (0.765) (1.516) (1.217) (0.716) (1.665) (0.943) 




Table 8. Follow up       
       
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Instruments for shadow economy:      
Durability of democracy Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Business freedom No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
athrho 0.0782+ 0.206** 0.110* 0.0420 0.166** 0.0441 
 (0.0451) (0.0664) (0.0502) (0.0339) (0.0611) (0.0374) 







 (0.149) (0.144) (0.162) (0.100) (0.0865) (0.103) 




Table 9. Determinants of probability of high growth aspiration startup (>10 jobs): cubic shadow 
economy. IV Probit & Probit 
      
 (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
      
Female -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.283*** -0.281*** -0.285*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0197) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.164*** -0.171*** -0.159*** -0.164*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0391) (0.0399) (0.0388) (0.0398) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.329*** 0.271*** 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.337*** 
 (0.0525) (0.0690) (0.0553) (0.0519) (0.0531) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.388*** 0.386*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.382*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0402) (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0303) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0793* 0.0763* 0.0838* 0.0796* 0.0832* 
 (0.0351) (0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0349) (0.0351) 
Education: higher 0.165*** 0.101+ 0.174*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0552) (0.0479) (0.0463) (0.0473) 
Education: secondary or more 0.104** 0.0239 0.100** 0.102** 0.112** 
 (0.0346) (0.0409) (0.0370) (0.0341) (0.0348) 
In employment 0.0447 0.0610 0.0335 0.0459 0.0542 
 (0.0351) (0.0434) (0.0360) (0.0352) (0.0349) 
Age 0.00549 0.00972 0.00700 0.00558 0.00530 
 (0.00862) (0.00941) (0.00931) (0.00862) (0.00873) 
Age squared -0.000163 -0.000220+ -0.000186 -0.000164 -0.000158 
 (0.000105) (0.000116) (0.000114) (0.000105) (0.000106) 
No fear of failure 0.285*** 0.251*** 0.290*** 0.285*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0330) (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0271) 
No confidence in own skills -0.595*** -0.546*** -0.603*** -0.594*** -0.596*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0511) (0.0366) (0.0344) (0.0352) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) 0.0293 -0.198 0.0285 0.0247 -0.00759 
 (0.0429) (0.150) (0.0534) (0.0436) (0.0446) 
Annual GDP growth rate 0.00793 0.0177 0.00967 0.00863 0.00458 
 (0.0123) (0.0243) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0110) 
Constraints on executive 0.0102 0.0395 0.00818 0.0124 0.00187 
 (0.0205) (0.0431) (0.0205) (0.0221) (0.0213) 
Gov. expense / GDP 
-
0.00967** -0.00644 -0.0101** -0.00949** 
-
0.00877** 
 (0.00325) (0.00540) (0.00333) (0.00314) (0.00303) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.0206+ -0.117* -0.0177 -0.0242* -0.0141 
 (0.0121) (0.0456) (0.0134) (0.00957) (0.0107) 
Shadow economy squared 0.000398+ 0.00189* 0.000334 0.000466** 0.000181 
 (0.000205) (0.000770) (0.000229) (0.000153) (0.000200) 
Constant -2.386*** 0.848 -2.405*** -2.317*** -2.059*** 
 (0.480) (1.897) (0.614) (0.468) (0.460) 
Annual Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9. Follow up      
      
 (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
Instruments for shadow econ.:      
Durability of democracy Yes No Yes No No 
Business freedom No Yes Yes No No 
Athrho -0.0158 0.246* -0.0324   
 (0.0225) (0.124) (0.0261)   
lnsigma 0.406** 0.847*** 0.382**   
 (0.130) (0.0826) (0.119)   




Table 10. Determinants of  probability of high growth aspiration  startup (>10 jobs): 
interactive terms. Probit model. 
 (26) (27) (28) 
Female -0.281*** -0.281*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0194) 
Owner/man. of exist.business -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.166*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0384) 
Business angel in last 3 years 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0521) (0.0518) 
Knows entrepreneurs 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.387*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0309) (0.0302) 
Education: postsec. or more 0.0796* 0.0795* 0.0844* 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0346) 
Education: higher 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0463) (0.0461) (0.0459) 
Education: secondary or more 0.102** 0.102** 0.107** 
 (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0330) 
In employment 0.0458 0.0460 0.0453 
 (0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0352) 
Age 0.00558 0.00558 0.00550 
 (0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00861) 
Age squared -0.000164 -0.000164 -0.000162 
 (0.000105) (0.000105) (0.000105) 
No fear of failure 0.274*** 0.285*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0268) (0.0268) 
No confidence in own skills -0.594*** -0.594*** -0.598*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0346) 
Nat. Log. of GDP pc (ppp) 0.0248 0.0240 -0.0332 
 (0.0435) (0.0445) (0.0452) 
Annual GDP growth rate 0.00866 0.00852 -0.00108 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.00945) 
Constraints on executive 0.0125 0.0124 -0.0640* 
 (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0298) 
Gov. expense / GDP -0.00949** -0.00983* -0.00850** 
 (0.00314) (0.00459) (0.00301) 
Shadow Econ/GDP -0.0247** -0.0252 -0.0521*** 
 (0.00945) (0.0199) (0.0110) 
Shadow Econ. Squared 0.000466** 0.000473* 0.000503*** 
 (0.000153) (0.000219) (0.000134) 
Shadow econ. X No fear  0.000584   
 (0.00290)   
Shadow econ. X Gov. Expense  2.26e-05  
  (0.000335) 
Shadow econ. X Exec. Constraints   0.00378*** 
   (0.000909) 
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Table 10. Continued    
 (22) (23) (24) 
Constant -2.310*** -2.298*** -1.275* 
 (0.474) (0.577) (0.553) 
Observations 244300 244300 244300 
 
